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ABSTRACT

Covert channels are becoming more popular as security risks grow in networks. One
area that is promising for covert channels is wireless networks, since many use a collision
avoidance scheme such as carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA).
These schemes often introduce randomness in the network, which provides good cover for a
covert timing channel. In this thesis, we use the 802.11 standard as an example to demonstrate a wireless covert channel. In particular, most 802.11 conﬁgurations use a distributed
coordinated function (DCF) to assist in communications. This DCF uses a random backoﬀ
to avoid collisions, which provides the cover for our covert channel. Our timing channel provides great improvements on other recent covert channels in the ﬁeld of throughput, while
maintaining high accuracy. We are able to achieve throughput over 8000 bps using Covert
DCF, or by accepting a throughput of 1800 bps we can achieve higher covertness and 99%
accuracy as well.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

In today’s society, security is becoming increasingly important in our networks. Initially,
security was not designed into many of the standards and protocols as the architects of the
Internet and standards never expected security to be an issue. However, it has become clear
that security is a major concern. We have seen techniques and security patches applied to
existing technology, as well as seen new technology and systems introduced with at least
some form of security included, at least at the most basic level. Unfortunately, no matter
how much security we continue to add, there will always be people looking to bypass that
security for various reasons.
One popular method for bypassing security protocols is the use of covert channels. By
using covert communication channels, an individual can hide messages and other information
within regular traﬃc, thus slipping by security protocols (in contrast to overt channels, where
the message is plain and sent openly). Classically, covert channels are classiﬁed as either
storage channels or timing channels [1]. Storage channels use some sort of storage medium
to hide messages, and timing channels use timing patterns to hide messages within regular
communication. In this thesis, we focus on covert timing channels.
Covert timing channels pose a great risk to security as they often bypass all security
measures in place altogether. A common example is the Bell-La Padula model, which enforces
high access control and security in government [2]. The access control is very secure in this
model due to two important mandatory access control rules. However, by creating a covert
channel, the access control can be bypassed altogether.
The timing channel we propose is an example of a wireless covert channel that allows for
higher bandwidth covert communication in comparison to other covert channels. One use for
this channel would be command and control of a wireless botnet. We have seen mobile device
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usage grow dramatically, and many of them now include 802.11 support. Unfortunately, this
growth also leads to additional malicious activity such as the iPhone/Privacy.A attacks which
steal personal data from jailbroken iPhones [3]. It is not hard to imagine botnets forming on
802.11 enabled devices in near future, and it is necessary to prepare ourselves and defenses
for these new forms of malicious activity.
On the other hand, covert channels could provide an added layer of security. For example, they could be used to store additional information as part of an access control scheme
as we demonstrated in [4]. While they should not be used as the sole method for access
control since they merely aim to provide security through obscurity, they could provide an
additional layer as part of an overall layered security scheme.
Our covert timing channel, Covert DCF, uses the 802.11 medium access control (MAC)
contention window (CW) in the distributed coordinated function (DCF) to send information.
The CW allows for random backoﬀ to reduce the number of collisions on the wireless medium
and also oﬀers the variability required for a covert channel. A sender can intelligently select
the CW for each outgoing frame [5], making it appear random over time. However, each
choice of the CW can represent a symbol from a codebook, and through these symbols the
covert message can be sent. Note, one instance of this (i.e., reducing the random backoﬀ
time) is considered mac misbehavior [5]. What we illustrate in this thesis, is that not only can
a node improve throughput using mac misbehavior, but it can also send messages covertly.
The receiving node reverses the process. First, the receiving node will calculate the CW
window used by the sender (based on gathered knowledge of the current network), and look
up the corresponding symbol in the codebook.
This scheme can easily be extended to other distributed wireless networks, since by
design they generally include some randomness to avoid collisions on the medium. This
randomness is the source of our timing channel.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present related work.
A brief overview of the 802.11 DCF is presented in Chapter 3, with an overview of our
proposed covert channel following in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 aims at optimizing individual
characteristics for our covert channel. Chapter 6 presents our covert channel in detail. We
present our analysis and results in Chapter 7. Lastly, Chapter 8 presents our conclusions
and we conclude with future work in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 2

RELATED WORK

In order to fully implement a covert channel as eﬀectively as possible, we must analyze
other covert channel designs, information theory of such channels, and also detection and
prevention methods of these channels.
There have been several designs of covert channels. Previous research has introduced
a good number of storage channels, with more recent research covering a wider range of
protocols and network layers as seen in [6–12]. Several covert timing channels have been
introduced as well such as that in [13], where the authors introduce one of the earlier basic
timing channels using IP inter-packet arrival time (IAT) patterns. This channel obtained
approximately 17 bps. However, it is easy to detect this covert timing channel based on the
regularity of the traﬃc it generates. Cabuk et al. provide an in-depth study of IP covert
channel detection in [14].
Sellke et al. demonstrate a TCP timing channel which can also be created in such
a way that it can hide among traﬃc that can be modeled by independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables in [15]. It requires the sender and receiver to agree
upon a seed in advance, and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) to model must have
an inverse. However, when the authors make their covert channel traﬃc computationally
indistinguishable within polynomial time from regular traﬃc, there is a signiﬁcant decrease
in the throughput. They demonstrated a maximum of 84 bps throughput for traﬃc that
is computationally distinguishable from legitimate traﬃc, or 5bps for the computationally
indistiguishable scheme. While being computationally indistinguishable can help hide the
covert message, the extremely low throughput detracts from the appeal of this method.
A few papers have also been written on 802.11 covert channel schemes as well. One
method we presented in [16] uses rate switching as the covert channel but has a maximum
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throughput of 96 bps. Furthermore, due to the unreliability of UDP, the rate switching
technique used can have a large eﬀect on UDP traﬃc. A simple covert storage channel at
the data link layer using the 802.11 sequence and WEP initial vector ﬁelds in the header
was introduced in [17].
We can also look at information theory related to covert channels. There are several
papers that discuss the capacity and bounds of timing channels. It is shown in [18] that
channels modeled by a single-server queue have a capacity greater than the service rate
of the queue. Channels with service time distributions which have bounded support are
considered in [19], and [20] analyzes the eﬀects of noise, such as time sharing delays of the
CPU and I/O. Real-time systems are considered in [21], in which operations are performed
at preemption points or within predetermined intervals.
Finally, we can also look at detection and prevention schemes. Because we are performing MAC misbehavior on our sending node, we need to avoid MAC misbehavior detection
schemes. Rong et al. [22] presented a method for detecting MAC misbehavior by looking at
throughput degradations observed at normal stations. Similar methods for calculating the
traﬃc gain ratio and traﬃc degradation ratio were presented in [23]. We presented a scheme
using a Naı̈ve Bayes classiﬁer and the IAT in [24]. In [25], the authors present a scheme that
looks directly at the number of idle slots and the collision probability calculated on each
observed node to determine if it is misbehaving or not.
While there are some detection schemes such as those presented in [26–28] that aim to
modify the 802.11 protocol itself to improve detection capabilities, they are out of the scope
of this thesis and not immediately applicable to the detection of our channel.
Furthermore, there have also been some mitigation schemes introduced that aim to
prevent the use of covert channels without requiring detection of them, as seen in [29, 30].
These schemes usually add some delay or padding to traﬃc on the network to throw oﬀ the
timing of covert timing channels. However, these schemes cannot aﬀect our timing channel
when used on the local wireless network, since no devices sit between the two nodes on the
network. The timing of our packets stems from a fundamental backoﬀ required in current
802.11 networks that cannot be removed without signiﬁcantly modifying the standard.
Some previous schemes can stay covert well with very little throughput. Other schemes
have higher throughput yet are easily detected. We seek to develop an 802.11 covert channel
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that optimizes throughput, accuracy, and covertness as necessary for intended usage. In
this work, we are able to achieve throughput of 2500 bps while remaining covert with 85%
accuracy, or 1800 bps while remaining covert with 99% accuracy.
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Chapter 3

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The 802.11 MAC uses carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA),
which is a DCF aimed at reducing collisions since they are not as easily detected on wireless
networks as on wired networks. The process is described in full detail in [31], but below we
discuss the essential details necessary for an understanding of our covert channel.
Before a station may transmit, it must sense whether or not the network is busy or
not. This check must be performed at both the physical layer and in the network allocation
vector (NAV), since two nodes may both be in range of an access point (AP), but not each
other.
If the medium is sensed to be busy, then the station must wait until it is no longer in
use before attempting to transmit. There is a required waiting period after the medium is no
longer busy before transmission is allowed. This serves two purposes. First, certain messages
such as acknowledgement (ACK) messages have higher priority than other messages such
as a new packet transmission. To provide higher priority, ACK messages have to wait a
shorter period of time, the Short Interframe Space (SIFS), to access the medium. Other
packets must wait a longer period of time, the DCF Interframe Space (DIFS), in addition
to a random period of backoﬀ time, before transmission.
The random backoﬀ time is required to solve the issue where multiple nodes may be
waiting for the medium to become free, and thus otherwise would all attempt to use the
medium at exactly the same time when the DIFS timer ran out. The random backoﬀ time
is calculated by multiplying a randomly selected number of slots from [0, CW ] by slot time,
which is a constant value. The random number of slots is chosen in the range of [0, CW ]
where the value of CW starts at CWmin and is doubled every time a collision occurs until
CW = CWmax , at which point it remains at CWmax until a successful transmission takes
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Figure 3.1. Transmission of packet using DCF

place. At this point, CW is set to CWmin again. This binary exponential backoﬀ is designed
to decrease the probability of collisions while keeping the wait time at a minimum. If at the
end of the waiting period the medium is still free, the station may transmit.
Fig. 3.1 shows the events that take place during transmission of a packet. Of notable
interest is the fact that outside of the random backoﬀ, there are no other random times. In
the next chapter, we use this to our advantage when developing Covert DCF.
In addition to the DCF, there are diﬀerent physical layers (PHY) that may be used
in 802.11 as well. For example, common PHY are direct-sequence (DS), frequency-hopping
spread spectrum (FHSS), and orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM). Each
modulation technique deﬁnes the actual length of DIFS, SIFS, slot times, and other timing
characteristics. While our proposed work does not modify or work directly at the physical
layer of the 802.11 protocol, it is necessary to know which PHY layer is being used in order
to perform the necessary calculations for backoﬀ.

8

Chapter 4

PROPOSED SCHEME

Covert DCF stems from the random backoﬀ that is required to take place when sending
new packets. By taking control of this random backoﬀ, we are able to encode diﬀerent
symbols using various backoﬀ values without drawing immediate attention to our channel
since the randomness helps disguise the channel.
The sender and receiver agree on a pre-deﬁned codebook which maps symbols from
S = {s is a bit string of length l(s)} to backoﬀ values. For example, we may let S = {0002 ,
0012 , 0102 , ..., 1112 } which sends three bits of information at a time. Symbol 0002 may be
associated with a backoﬀ of 100µs and symbol 0102 with a backoﬀ of 150µs. We describe
how we choose the symbols in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.
Fig. 4.1 illustrates a high level view of a simple case using our covert channel. In this
example, the receiving node is on the wireless side of the network, and S = {00002 , ..., 11112 }.
The sender chooses to send the phrase BAD. There may or may not be regular nodes communicating on the network.

Figure 4.1. High level view of scheme
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In the design of Covert DCF, we focus on three important characteristics to consider:
throughput, accuracy, and covertness.
Throughput determines how fast we can send data across the channel. To increase
throughput, we could increase the baud rate β, which is the number of state changes that
take place over any given period of time. In the context of this research, state changes occur
with each packet sent. Alternatively, we can change |S|, the number of symbols within S.
If we let l(s) be the number of bits in element sεS, then throughput can be calculated as
bps = β ∗ l(s) for our channel. Chapter 5 discusses optimizing throughput in more detail.
Accuracy is another important aspect to consider. Without high accuracy, the covert
channel may not be very useful. In overt communication, including the standard 802.11
protocol, accuracy is often achieved through two-way communication and the use of ACK
messages. However, covert channels are often one-way, thus ACK messages are not used and
the channel must function without them. We consider accuracy in more detail in Chapter 5
as well.
Finally, we also wanted to consider covertness. After all, it is covertness which separates
our channel from regular overt channels. It is important to try to balance throughput,
accuracy, and covertness during the design of our channel. We present several methods used
to determine covertness in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5

MAXIMIZING THROUGHPUT, ACCURACY, AND COVERTNESS

In this chapter, we will analyze and discuss how we can maximize throughput, accuracy,
and covertness. We also discuss any performance changes observed as we optimize each.
Afterwards, we will devise a strategy of optimizing the channel for any particular use.

5.1

Throughput
In order to maximize throughput, we want to optimize both β and |S|. At ﬁrst glance,

an increase in either should increase the throughput.
We can increase β by minimizing the IAT. In this case, we minimize our choice of
random backoﬀ. For example, if we have |S| = 4, we can minimize the average IAT by using
s1 = 0, s2 = 1, s3 = 2, and s4 = 3 for each symbol si . This will have a smaller average IAT
than if we used s1 = 0, s2 = 10, s3 = 20, and s4 = 30.
Next, we calculate the average backoﬀ for each set S as |S| increases for any given PHY.
By dividing the average backoﬀ by l(s), we are able to determine how long on average each
bit takes to transmit, and in turn calculate the bits per second.
More formally, let S = {s is a bit string of length l(s)} be our symbol set. Furthermore, let our time values be in µs for all calculations. Then the average transmission time
avg trans timel(s) can be calculated as
∑2l(s)
avg trans timel(s) =
where

k=0

trans timek
2l(s)

(5.1)

11

trans timek =DIF S + bok + T xT ime
+ SIF S + ACKT xT ime

(5.2)

for DIF S, SIF S, and ACKT xT ime ﬁxed for any particular PHY. T xT ime depends on the
PHY along with payload size. Finally, bok is the backoﬀ as determined using the scheme
mentioned previously, and can be calculated as

bok = k(slot time)

(5.3)

where k represents the k th symbol in S.
Note that we are only interested in symbol set sizes that make full use of all bits for
any l(s) length bit string. That is, we deﬁne S such that |S| = 2l(s) .
Using the average transmission time, we conclude that the time per bit tpbl(s) can be
calculated as

tpbl(s) =

avg trans timel(s)
l(s)

(5.4)

1 000 000µs
.
tpbl(s)

(5.5)

and thus bits per second bpsl(s) is

bpsl(s) =

12000

Bits Per Second

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

0

0

2

4

6
Bits Per Symbol
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Figure 5.1. Theoretical Throughput
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In Fig. 5.1, we see an initial increase in throughput as we increase |S|. However, we
observe that it peaks around l(s) = 5 and then begins to drop. This decrease in throughput
is due to the fact that each additional bit we add to s doubles |S|. This exponential increase
in |S| leads to an exponential increase in the average random backoﬀ. On the other hand,
we only see a linear gain in number of bits sent with each additional bit used in S. At
approximately l(s) = 5 we ﬁnd that the throughput gains by sending a larger number of bits
at a time are outweighed by the signiﬁcant increase in random backoﬀ.
We ﬁnd similar results for other PHY. The peak tends to be located when 4 ≤ l(s) ≤ 6
depending on the PHY characteristics and average packet size.
These results form curves similar to those seen in [15].
We ﬁnd that theoretically our maximum throughput is high. We can theoretically obtain
bit rates far greater than introduced in other covert channels. We must keep in mind that
we have created this scheme speciﬁcally to focus on maximizing throughput without regard
to the eﬀects on accuracy and covertness. However, as we will see later in the thesis, we can
maintain high accuracy, covertness, and high throughput at the same time in many cases.

5.2

Accuracy
When considering accuracy, we must consider how many nodes are sending on the

wireless network, where the receiving or listening node is located (wired side or wireless side
of the network), and how much error we are allotted when calculating the number of slots
used during the backoﬀ.
Since accuracy depends on the ability of the receiving node to properly identify the
correct IAT, the number of senders plays an important role. If there is only one sender,
the error in decoding the IAT should be minimal since the sending node always obtains
the wireless medium when desired. However, in the case of multiple senders, another node
may choose a shorter random backoﬀ and access the medium before the malicious node. If
this is the case, the malicious node will have to defer transmission until the medium is free
again. These other transmissions caused by other nodes can cause increases in the IAT when
examining two consecutive packets sent by the malicious node.
Case 1. single sender, wireless receiver: In the ﬁrst case, high accuracy is easy to obtain.
Since the malicious node does not compete with other nodes for the medium, there should
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be minimal delays.
Case 2. single sender, wired receiver: Similarly, in single-sender wireless-side, we can also
decode the IAT with high accuracy for the same reason as described in Case 1. However,
there may be slightly larger delays than in Case 1 due to the additional hop required on the
network. We can compensate for these slightly larger delays by using ranges for each symbol
instead of single values. That is, instead of using the set S = {s is a bit string} to represent
our symbols we use A = {S is a unique set of consecutive bit strings}.
Case 3. multiple senders, wireless receiver: In this case, we must account for the fact that
other nodes may use the medium, thus causing the malicious node to delay transmission.
Since the receiving node is located on the wireless side of the network, the receiver can
observe all traﬃc on the wireless medium. If the receiver senses a frame sent by another
node (either physically or via the NAV) it can simply disregard the information and adjust
its IAT timer accordingly.
Case 4. multiple senders, wired receiver: This last case is the most challenging out of the
four cases. We cannot assume that the receiving node knows when other nodes transmit
on the wireless network. This inability leads to diﬃculties in calculating the proper IAT
since there may or may not have been delays due to other nodes on the wireless network.
To handle this situation, we must create our codebook in such a way that received symbols
cannot be improperly interpreted.
To do so, we must know the minimum amount of time required for a transmission on
the wireless medium. Before using the covert channel, the sending and receiving nodes must
know the distribution of packet sizes on the wireless network.
By obtaining the distribution of packet sizes, we can calculate the extra delay added per
additional transmission by other nodes. For example, if we know that 95% of packets sent on
the network are 1125-1875 bytes in length, then we can calculate with 95% conﬁdence that
the amount of time required to send a transmission will be between 225.97µs and 331.97µs
(using DS PHY in this case). In this example, we obtain that if we let S = {00002 , ..., 11002 },
and the receiver decodes it as a value in that range, then no other packets were sent between
our two transmissions, thus the IAT should be decoded correctly. Fig. 5.2 demonstrates the
two decoding possibilities for the lower bound of this example. Using this knowledge, we are
able to choose the proper codebook and symbol set for the network.
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Figure 5.2. Minimum time required to send packet

We must take note that this will signiﬁcantly decrease our choice of S, since we can only
use small values for the backoﬀ. In our example above, we cannot make use of all symbols
where l(s) = 4, since any symbols larger than 11002 will require more than 331.97µs to
transmit.
We must also mention that the 802.11 DCF protocol by default selects a random backoﬀ
in the range of [0, CW]. Thus if we continue to use the same scheme with our chosen CW
values, we will see overlap between symbols. For example, if symbol s1 is represented by
CW = 8 and s2 has CW = 3, then there is a 44% chance that s1 and s2 overlap. Instead,
we simply adjust and set our random backoﬀ to the CW value itself. This requires MAC
misbehavior on the sending node, but all other nodes remain untouched.
In addition to the location of the sending and receiving nodes, we should also consider
how much error we allot the receiver node when calculating the backoﬀ slots. Earlier, we
attempted to maximize our throughput by optimizing β. We set each symbol to a single
backoﬀ, without any room for error. While this does help improve our throughput on the
sending node, it can aﬀect the accuracy on the receiving node. To increase accuracy, we
let A = {S is a unique set of consecutive bit strings}. In other words, instead of using the
higher throughput values s1 = 0, s2 = 1, s3 = 2, and s4 = 3 we could use s1 = 0 − 9, s2 =
10 − 19, s3 = 20 − 29, and s4 = 30 − 39. The former case requires an exact calculation on
the number of backoﬀ slots, whereas the latter allows us a little room for error from delays.
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(a) Case 1

(b) Case 2

(c) Case 3

(d) Case 4

Figure 5.3. Accuracy Cases
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5.3

Covertness
Lastly, we want to maximize our covertness. There are several angles from which we

can analyze covertness.
Covertness is often evaluated based on throughput or traﬃc distribution. In [15], Sellke
et al. demonstrate a covert channel that models a Pareto distribution, similar to Telnet
traﬃc, at the sacriﬁce of a low throughput. Some channels introduce their own traﬃc into
the network, whereas others are more passive such as PSUDP, which modiﬁes pre-existing
DNS queries to embed a storage channel [32].
However, there are also some 802.11 speciﬁc detections that we wish to avoid as well.
Because we are performing MAC misbehavior on our sending node, we need to avoid MAC
misbehavior detection schemes similar to those presented earlier.
Similarly, we need to be able to bypass wireless intrusion detection systems (WIDS) and
wireless intrusion prevention systems (WIPS). At the time of this writing, WIDS and WIPS
have seen a lot of development in the ﬁeld of wireless device management (AP management
and authorization, rogue access point detection) along with traﬃc analysis, yet as far as
we are aware none currently look for covert channels. Nevertheless, we do not want our
malicious node to create an anomaly displayed on traﬃc analysis tools.
Consider Motorola AirDefense Enterprise [33], which is a popular commercial WIPS
solution. As of this writing, AirDefense Enterprise provides down to the minute granularity
with regards to traﬃc data point collection. Thus we need to ensure that our malicious
node’s data points match those of regular traﬃc. To do so, we only need to ensure that over
any given 60 second window, our traﬃc averages out similar to that of regular traﬃc over a
given 60 second window.
In this thesis, we base our covert analysis on:
1. Throughput Changes
(a) sender throughput gain
(b) legitimate node traﬃc degradation
(c) network throughput change
2. Sorted backoﬀ for traﬃc regularity
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3. Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
In all of the above cases, we use data and samples that ﬁt a 60 second window. These
tests allow us to assess our covert channel both visually and quantitatively within the capabilities of WIDS / WIPS.
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Chapter 6

COVERT DCF PROTOCOL DESIGN

In this Chapter, we will present our protocol used for sending and receiving.

6.1

Covert DCF Sending Protocol
Before we begin using Covert DCF, we must ﬁrst do some analysis on the network in

order to help us increase our accuracy and covertness. First, we capture traﬃc on the WLAN
in order to obtain average throughput, traﬃc distribution, and packet size distribution. The
ﬁrst two will help us increase our covertness, whereas packet size will help us increase our
accuracy. Note that both the receiver and the sender must have this information.
We also need to know which PHY characteristics are being used. We can obtain this
information using the Radiotap headers [34]. We must note that this information must also
be available to both sender and receiver. As such, if the receiving node is on the wired-side
of the network, then we must assume all traﬃc uses the same PHY throughout the covert
communication.
Next, the sender will take the bit sequence that represents the covert message and
encode it into the proper delay sequence based on a codebook. The speciﬁcs of the codebook
will depend on the requirements for the covert channel, and the location of the receiving
node.
If the receiving node is on the wireless side of the network and within listening distance
of the sending node, then we can use a larger symbol set |S| with a larger baud rate, thus
increasing our throughput.
If the receiving node is on the wired side of the network, we must be able to ensure that
the messages can be decoded with high accuracy. Other sending nodes on the network may
access the medium ﬁrst, thus causing our IAT to consist of our planned IAT, along with the
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extra delay involved with the medium being used by other nodes or due to collisions. By
choosing an appropriately small S as discussed in Chapter 5, we are able to correctly decode
the IAT in this situation.
Furthermore, we may choose to increase our allotted error by using ranges of values
instead of single values for our symbols. For networks with heavier delays, a larger range
would be required.
Once the sender has S along with the delay sequence, we must ensure that it closely
matches the traﬃc throughput and distribution of other nodes. In order to do this, we
rely on traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols. These are symbols in the codebook that have no meaning to
the sender or receiver - they are used solely for increasing covertness. Alternatively, traﬃcﬁtting symbols could be time based, such as embedding them in every 5th packet, provided
the receiver knows to ignore every 5th packet. Algorithm 1 below presents our scheme for
inserting traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols.
Algorithm 1 Sequence Adjustment
1: for all windows do
2:
t ⇐ training window
3:
m ⇐ message window
4:
for all v in t do
N T (v)
t prob[v] ⇐ COU
5:
SIZE(t)
6:
end for
7:
n⇐m
8:
while SIZE(n) < window size do
9:
for all v in n do
N T (v)
10:
n prob[v] ⇐ COU
SIZE(n)
11:
end for
12:
largest dif f ⇐ M AX(t prob[v] − n prob[v])
if largest dif f > 0 then
13:
14:
PUSH n, ld value
15:
else
16:
for all p in n prob do
if p > 0 then
17:
18:
PUSH n, p value
end if
19:
20:
end for
end if
21:
end while
22:
23: end for

Our goal is to match the empirical cumulative distribution function (ecdf) of the backoﬀs
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on our sending node to that of backoﬀs from a legitimate node. To begin, we need training
data from legitimate traﬃc that contains at least as many data points as our initial sequence
of symbols we wish to send. We then break both sets down into windows, which allows us
to match distributions within the entire set as well as the over all ecdf.
For each window, we calculate the probabilities of each backoﬀ from our training data.
That is, we may discover that a value of 5 slot times occurs 15% of the time, and a value
of 20 slot times only occurs 5% of the time. We then also calculate the probabilities of our
current sequence we intend to send - this is initialized to the initial sequence and will grow
as we insert traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols. Next, we adjust the probabilities as needed, but we must
note that we cannot remove symbols from our new sequence, as we rely on them for our
message. We can only add to the sequence.
In our example, say a value of 5 slot times occurs 15% of the time in our training data
and only 10% of the time in our covert sequence. In this case, we simply need to insert more
values of 5 slots into our sequence until it reaches the correct probability.
On the other hand, consider if the same value occurs 15% of the time in the training data
and 20% of the time in our sequence. We cannot simply remove the extra, since we rely on
them for our message. Instead, we increase the probability of other symbols, which increases
the population size thus decreasing the probability of our target value. In particular, we
choose to increase the probability of other symbols which are already too low - this way we
help give them a higher probability and decrease the probability of our target value at the
same time.
When inserting our traﬃc ﬁtting symbols, we do so using the placement based method.
We may send 1 covert packet per 3 traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols. This ratio must be known on
both ends so that the proper packets will be thrown out upon decoding.
After one round of this adjustment, our sequence ecdf should be slightly closer to that
of our target ecdf. We repeat this process for multiple rounds, each time re-calcuating the
probabilities of our covert sequence (since they will change each round), and after enough
rounds the ecdf of our covert sequence window and our training window will be similar. If
our initial sequence were similar to begin with, it will take fewer rounds than if it were quite
dissimilar.
Using this method, it allows us to match the ecdf of any training data, regardless of if
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there is a known distribution with an inverse that matches it, which is a method seen in [15].
When performing our tests, we were unable to ﬁnd a good ﬁt to a known distribution that
also had an inverse function for our training data.
At this point, we should have a sequence that will have a high throughput, accuracy, and
covertness. A malicious process on the sending node uses this delay sequence for subsequent
traﬃc. The traﬃc can be destined for any location, as long as the receiving node is en route.
Algorithm 2 Backoﬀ Selection
Require: use covert ⇐ true
Require: delay seq ⇐ symbol sequence
Require: seq pos ⇐ −1
Require: seq len ⇐ len(delay seq) − 1
1: for all packets to send do
2:
if use covert is true then
3:
if short retry count + long retry count = 0 or perf orm cw is true then
4:
seq pos ⇐ seq pos + 1
5:
end if
6:
backof f slots ⇐ delay seq[seq pos]
7:
if seq pos = seq len then
8:
use covert ⇐ f alse
9:
end if
10:
else
11:
backof f slots ⇐ rand(0, CW ) {use standard procedure}
12:
end if {send packet}
13: end for

To send, we implement Algorithm 2 in the MAC layer. This algorithm steps through
our sequence of delays sending them appropriately. If we are resending a packet for any
reason such as a collision, then we resend it using the appropriate delay. Once the entire
message has been sent, we return to using the standard MAC protocol.

6.2

Covert DCF Receiving Protocol
The decoding node listens for all packets on the network. Knowing the MAC address or

IP address of the sending node, the decoder can properly choose when to decode a symbol
and when to wait until the appropriate packet is processed to decode the symbol. Note that
the decoder must be either on the same basic service set (BSS), which consists of all stations
sharing a single AP, as the sending node (using the MAC address) or on the network between
the sender and destination address (using the IP address).
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First, the receiver must calculate the IAT. Next, the receiver calculates the backoﬀ in
terms of µs and from that obtains the number of backoﬀ slots used.
To obtain the backoﬀ slot count, the decoder initializes backoﬀ time bo time = IAT .
Next, the decoder subtracts DIFS, SIFS, payload transmission time T xT ime, and ACK
transmission time ACKT xT ime. At the end of this process, we can convert the bo time to
actual slots (thus symbols) by dividing it by the slot time for the given PHY. This process
can be seen in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Symbol Decoding
Require: prev recv time ⇐ 0
Ensure: list of decoded symbols
1: for all packets received do
2:
curr recv time ⇐ N OW
3:
IAT ⇐ curr recv time − prev recv time
4:
bo time ⇐ IAT {initialize}
5:
bo time ⇐ bo time − dif s time
rcvd pk size
6:
bo time ⇐ bo time − rcvd
{TxTime}
f rame drate
7:
bo time ⇐ bo time − sif s time
pk size
8:
bo time ⇐ bo time − rcvdackf rame
{AckTxTime}
drate
bo time
9:
decoded slots ⇐ slot time
10:
if remote addr = sender addr then
11:
decoded slots ⇐ decoded slots + of f set
of f set ⇐ 0
12:
13:
print decoded slots
14:
else
15:
of f set ⇐ of f set + decoded slots
16:
end if
17:
prev recv time ⇐ curr recv time
18: end for

If the receiver is on the same BSS as the sending node, the receiver can also compensate
for other traﬃc on the network to ensure the accuracy remains high regardless of other
traﬃc. To do so, if a packet is detected from a node other than the sending node, then
the receiver calculates the decoded slots as described above and adds the resulting value to
of f set. When a packet arrives from the sending node, the receiving node adds of f set to the
number of decoded slots and reset of f set to 0. By using this oﬀset, we are able to calculate
the correct backoﬀ that was initially chosen by the sending node even though there may have
been other traﬃc on the network.
Once the receiver has obtained the set of symbols sent by the sending node, the receiver
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looks these symbols up in the pre-determined codebook to determine the values represented
by each symbol. If traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols have been used, the receiver ignores those symbols.
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Chapter 7

IMPLEMENTATION, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND NUMERICAL
RESULTS

7.1

Implementation
To test Covert DCF, we used OPNET to simulate our covert channel. Our simulation

consisted of a BSS consisting of our sending node, one wireless receiving node, one wired
receiving node one hop away, one access point, and 15 regular wireless nodes. The AP was
connected to a switch, which also had connections to Ethernet servers and the IP cloud, as
illustrated in Fig. 7.1.

Figure 7.1. OPNET Network Layout

For our simulations, we chose to use the 802.11g PHY characteristics, since it is both
widely depoloyed and oﬀers 54Mbps data rate. At the application layer, we used FTP as
it can provide many packets back to back which is necessary for a covert timing channel.
However, we also did some analysis on other protocols such as HTTP and present those
results as well.
We ran 100 trials for each conﬁguration of |S| up to l(s) = 12, and a summary of our
results can be found in Table 7.1.
We modiﬁed the wlan mac process model in OPNET in order to test our channel.
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Summary of Simulations
Throughput Covert Accuracy
8600bps
5500bps
2500bps
1800bps
5500bps
900bps
140bps

No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

85%
99%
85%
99%
27%
99%
99%

Receiver
wireless
wireless
wireless
wireless
wired
wired
wired

Table 7.1. Summary of simulations

In addition, we made the necessary changes to wlan mac dispatch, wlan workstation, and
wlan station. We added an option to ”enable” or ”disable” covert channel functionality
within each node. Using this switch, we enabled the covert channel on our sending node and
receiving node and disabled it on all other nodes (thus leaving the original conﬁguration for
those nodes).
Our sending node read a message from a standard text ﬁle, and using the steps as
described in the previous chapter, created the covert sequence. The receiving nodes were
set to packet capture mode for all packets and decoded the sequence as we have previously
discussed. We ran 100 trials for each conﬁguration of |S| up to l(s) = 12.
7.2

Throughput
Our simulations show that we are able to obtain high throughput using our channel.

Fig. 7.2 shows a comparison of our theoretical throughput as presented in Chapter 5, and
the simulated throughput from sending an ASCII ﬁle in plain text, compressed, and CAST5
encrypted versions. We can see that our channel performed similar to our expected performance. However, it can be observed that some data points for l(s) > 8 during the plain text
transmission are actually slightly higher than our predicted rates. This can be explained by
distribution of backoﬀs used for the plain text ﬁle. The theoretical throughput was based on
sending completely random symbols, whereas our codebook mapping of our plain text ﬁle
consisting of English language ASCII characters, mapped to the lower valued symbols from
S rather than the entire range for ease of calculations. Both compressing and encrypting the
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message remove this information from the ﬁle, thus they follow the theoretical value more
closely.

12000
theoretical
plain message
compressed message
encrypted message

Bits Per Second

10000

8000

6000
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0
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4
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8

10

12

Figure 7.2. Covert channel throughput comparison (ASCII text)

7.3

Covertness
As mentioned in Chapter 5, we will analyze the covertness of our channel by looking at

throughput changes, sorted backoﬀs, and two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
7.3.1

Throughput Changes

We will ﬁrst show that throughput changes can occur using our channel if we assume
an aggressive sender that does not aim to be covert. We will then demonstrate how we can
improve the channel to have little eﬀect on the throughput of the standard communication
channel.
Fig. 7.3 shows various throughput variations of the standard channel communication
assuming we have a very aggressive sender, using a 60 second window. Fig. 7.3(a) shows
us that as we vary |S|, our standard channel throughput varies as well. This makes sense,
because if we use a smaller |S| and use small backoﬀs, then we will win the contention on the
network more often than other nodes, thus getting an unfair usage of the network. We can
see that between l(s) = 4 and l(s) = 5 is where our node should be if it were not performing
MAC misbehavior. Using l(s) = 3 yields throughput increases similar to those in [35] for
α = 0.5 due to the fact that they use the same set of backoﬀs. Similarly, Fig. 7.3(b) shows
the traﬃc degradation of legitimate nodes when Covert DCF is in use.
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However, in Fig. 7.3(c) we see that if our malicious node is very aggressive, the overall
network throughput can actually increase. This is due to the fact that our malicious node
easily wins the contention, and thus on average the backoﬀs used on the network are much
smaller.
In all graphs in Fig. 7.3, we observe that the closest matches to legitimate traﬃc falls
somewhere between 4 bit symbol and 5 bit symbol usage.
If we are smart about our usage of the channel, however, we can make it much more
diﬃcult to detect, as seen in 7.4. By embedding some traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols, or backoﬀs that
carry no meaning, within our covert message, we are able to get a much closer ﬁt. This does
degrade Covert DCF throughput in exchange for additional covertness. Using this scheme,
our throughput drops to roughly 2500bps from over 8000bps. It is up to the user to determine
how important throughput, accuracy, and covertness are for the channel.
7.3.2

Sorted Backoﬀs

We can also look at the sorted backoﬀ times as presented in [13]. In [13], the authors
used the sorted backoﬀs to look for steps in the graph, which represent regularity in the
IAT times. It also provides yet another method for viewing and comparing the distribution
of packets. Fig. 7.5(a) shows the sorted backoﬀ times for aggressive usage of the covert
channel. We can see that if we send 4 bits at a time, the sorted backoﬀs follow much closer
to that of overt traﬃc than if we send 7 bits at a time. This is because 4 bit symbols align
to 16 backoﬀs, and by default overt traﬃc initially selects a backoﬀ from [0, 15] on 802.11g
networks. If each symbol occupied two backoﬀ slots to increase accuracy, then 3 bit symbols
oﬀer the best match. However, 7 bit symbols are easily detected if heavily used, since many
more backoﬀs are used than in overt communication.
Again, we can be smarter about our usage. By implementing our traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols,
we can see that it is much more diﬃcult to detect. Fig. 7.5(b) shows a comparison of the
sorted backoﬀs for overt communication and the previously easily detected 7 bit symbol
covert channel when we sacriﬁce throughput for covertness.
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Figure 7.5. Sorted backoﬀ times

7.3.3

Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test

Lastly, we perform some quantitative analysis by comparing the empirical cumulative
distribution functions (ecdf) of legitimate traﬃc slot times and our covert traﬃc slot times.
These come directly from the IAT and random backoﬀ. We then perform a KolmogorovSmirnov (K-S) test to determine if it is possible if the two sets of data come from the same
distribution. For the K-S test, we state that the null hypothesis is that the two samples
come from the same distribution, and we use a signiﬁcance level of α = 0.05.
Fig. 7.6 shows the ecdf for legitimate traﬃc, traﬃc consisting of 10% message symbols
and 90% traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols, and traﬃc consisting of 100% message symbols without any
traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols.
We can see that the legitimate traﬃc distribution and the 10% message symbol traﬃc
distribution are nearly identical, whereas the message without traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols stands
out.
Furthermore, if we run a K-S test comparing the legitimate traﬃc vs. 10% message
symbol traﬃc and legitimate traﬃc vs. 100% message symbol traﬃc, we obtain the p-values
0.6 and 0.001 respectively. Similarly, the K-S test statistics for these were 0.04 and 0.13.
Thus with at the 10% rate, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, but we do reject it if we do
not include traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols.
However, as we increase the number of bits sent per symbol, it becomes more diﬃcult
to ﬁt the distribution. We must insert many more traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols to align the two
distributions. Fig. 7.7 shows the same tests performed using 7 bit symbols. We can see that
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while the 10% rate is much closer to legitimate traﬃc than the 100% rate, it still is not quite
aligned with the original distribution. In both cases, we must reject the null hypothesis at
the 5% signiﬁcance level.
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Figure 7.7. 7 Bit Symbol Backoﬀ - Empirical CDF

In this sample network traﬃc, it was possible to remain covert with 4 bit symbols at
the 10% and 25% rates using α = 0.05. On a network with more delays, the distributions of
5, 6, or 7 bit symbols may align with legitimate traﬃc backoﬀs more closely, thus allowing
those to be used as well.
We must note that as we increase the number of traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols, we do lose
throughput since we must send more symbols. At 10%, the length of our covert sequence is
10 times longer than it would be without traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols, and we obtained throughput
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of 1367 bps. Similarly, at the 25% rate, the covert sequence will be 4 times longer than
without traﬃc ﬁtting-symbols 1890 bps.

7.4

Accuracy
To maximize throughput, we chose to separate our symbols by a single slot time in

order to increase β as described earlier. Using this scheme, we found that we were able to
achieve 85% accuracy while the network was under heavy load by adjusting the oﬀset value
for traﬃc generated by other nodes. However, further inspection showed that many of the
values that were decoded incorrectly were only oﬀ by one slot time.
Thus, by allowing each symbol to cover a range of values (as few as two) rather than a
single backoﬀ value, we could easily increase the accuracy. In this case, we let each symbol
occupy two backoﬀ slot positions. In doing so, our accuracy went from 85% to over 99%
for the same message. We must note that this adjustment can also decrease β and thus
the throughput. Our high throughput dropped from an average of 8600bps to an average of
5500bps without traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols. We could achieve 1890bps with 99% accuracy with
traﬃc-ﬁtting symbols.
Following our previous ﬁndings, we analyzed our results from the wired receiver. We
continued to use A as our symbol set varying |A|. Similar to above, we found that we could
not decode the sequence perfectly using single values. Not surprisingly, we also discovered
that letting each symbol be represented by a range of two values also failed to have high
accuracy due to additional network delays. Using a range of two for each symbol only gave
us an accuracy of 27%. However, by setting our range to ﬁfteen instead of two, we were able
to bring our accuracy back up to over 99%. In order to gain this higher accuracy, we had to
accept a throughput of only 900bps.

7.5

Light Traﬃc Protocols
As mentioned earlier, we used FTP at the application layer to facilitate back to back

traﬃc, which is necessary for a covert timing channel. Without this type of traﬃc, it is
impossible to tell whether or not a given IAT was planned due to the timing channel or
simply delays at the user or application level.
However, we can make an educated guess whether or not delays were from the covert
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timing channel or user delays by using a timing threshhold. For example, if our maximum
delay used in the covert timing channel is 500µs and the receiving node detects a delay of 3
seconds (after processing any calculated oﬀset), then it is safe to assume this is not part of
the covert timing channel, so we toss the packet.
So let our threshhold value be
threshhold = DIF S + SIF S + T xT ime + AckT xT ime + (max slots ∗ slot time).
At the sending node, if two packets are not back to back, then the receiver does not encode
the next symbol for the covert channel. At the receiving node, if a packet arrives above
the threshhold value, the receiver ignores it since the packet did not immediately follow the
previous packet. Otherwise, the receiver assumes the two packets were back to back and
decodes the symbol accordingly.
Using this scheme we can still obtain high accuracy and covertness, but throughput is
signiﬁcantly reduced if the application level does not generate heavy back-to-back traﬃc. We
tested using an assortment of light usage traﬃc (HTTP, SMTP, POP3, etc), and throughput
was approximately 0.03bps - extremely low. A 5kb text ﬁle takes approximately 10 days to
transmit at this rate. However, we noticed that by increasing |S|, we could obtain faster
throughputs. By using 10 bits per symbol instead of 5, we were able to get a 50% increase
in throughput. Since we must wait so long for two packets to be sent back to back, it makes
sense to send as much data as possible. We just need to ensure that we do not increase it
too much, or else application level delays and covert timing delays may get confused. We
simply need to ensure that our threshhold is high enough to account for all symbols and low
enough that it does not allow for application level delays to fall below it.
We must note that without heavy back to back traﬃc, any covert timing channel would
be aﬀected, not just Covert DCF. Timing channels rely on the timing between packets, so
the packets must exist and be ready to be sent when needed.
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CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis, we introduced a scheme to implement a covert timing channel that is
applicable for wireless networks that make use of random backoﬀ in order to avoid collisions.
We provided an analysis of aspects resulting in a good covert channel. We demonstrated our
channel using the 802.11g wireless protocol through analysis and simulation.
Thus far, we have shown that it is possible to obtain throughput for our covert timing
channel far greater than that of previous covert timing channels. Our channel also maintains
good accuracy and can operate covertly as well. When both the sending and receiving node
are on the same wireless network, we were able to obtain over 8000 bps throughput with
approximately 85% accuracy, or by slightly modifying our code we were able to increase
accuracy to over 99% while maintaining a throughput over 5000 bps. Adding in covertness
drops our throughput to 1800bps, but we are still able to maintain over 99% accuracy at this
rate while operating in a more covert fashion. In both cases, the network was under heavy
load from regular nodes as well. When the receiving node was an additional hop away on
the wired network, we were still able to maintain over 99% accuracy but at the sacriﬁce of
higher throughput. We were only able to maintain approximately 900bps throughput in this
case. This ﬁgure drops futher if the need to be covert is high.
In comparison with other covert channels, Covert DCF oﬀers a good alternative when
the covert channel is to be used over shorter distances such as wireless LANs or within a
couple hops of the wireless LAN.
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FUTURE WORK

In the future, we intend to perform additional investigations of methods to increase
the covertness of Covert DCF and additional analysis for the detection of Covert DCF.
Covert channels will continue to be an interesting area of research in the foreseeable future,
and methods of increasing the covertness of our channel and other covert channels will be
exciting to explore.
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